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"Or of the [Blog]"t
Paul Horwitz*

"Weblogging will drive a powerful
new form of amateur journalism as millions of Net users . . . take on the role of
columnist, reporter, analyst and publisher while fashioning their own personal broadcasting networks."
-J.D. Lasica'
"Isn't blogging basically for angry,
semi-employed losers who are too untalented or too lazy to get real jobs in journalism?"
2
- Garry Trudeau
I.

Introduction

Close to seventy years ago, Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Supreme
Court in Lovell v. Griffin, 3 noted that
"[t]he liberty of the press is not confined
to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets
*..the press in its historic connotation
comprehends every sort of publication
which affords a vehicle of information
and opinion."4 A mere forty years ago,
t

Mr. Justice Black added that "[the Constitution specifically selected the press,
which includes not only newspapers,
books and magazines, but also humble
leaflets and circulars, to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs."5 Those Justices surely were
looking back to our long tradition of
"lonely pamphleteer[s] "6 for they could
not possibly have foreseen what was coming down the pike.
I am talking, of course, about the rise
of blogs and the blogosphere. 7 We are
witnessing an explosion in the number of
blogs. While the estimated number of
blogs varies greatly, one blog-tracking
site boasts that it is currently tracking
23.1 million sites. s Many of those sites
are moribund, but other blogs are regularly updated. Nor are these blogs all
simply collections of travel photos or diary entries read by only a few friends or
relatives. Many blogs offer up-to-theminute reflections on current affairs, and
the most popular of these can receive tens

Cf Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
* Associate Professor, Southwestern University School of Law. Co-blogger on Prawfsblawg, http:l!
prawfsblawg.blogs.com. Thanks to Mike Dorff, Danni Hart, Kelly Horwitz, Sung Hui Kim, and Austen Parrish
for comments on a draft of this paper.
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of thousands of visits per day. 9 One survey suggests that "by the end of 2004[,]
32 million Americans were blog readers."10
Beyond the numbers, we have also
witnessed a growth in the importance
and influence of blogs. Whether or not
their impact has been or will be revolutionary, as some claim," it is certainly
true that blogs have assumed a growing
role in breaking news, or in calling attention to existing news stories in a way that
may have a significant real-world impact. 12 Although blogs are most often
thought of as supplements to existing
news media, forming a symbiotic relationship with them,13 the more evangelical proponents of blogs, and detractors of
the so-called "mainstream media,"14 have
suggested that blogs are in fact displacing traditional forms of gathering and
disseminating the news. 15 Only slightly
more mildly, Richard Posner has written
that blogs pose a "grave[ I challenge to
the journalistic establishment."16 Given
the novelty of the phenomenon, we may
take these claims with a grain of salt.
Still, it is fair to say that blogs bid fair to
unsettle the dominant status of the conventional news media. We might say
that the rise of the blog represents the realization of the full promise of the "lonely
pamphleteer."17
As they mature and are given increasing prominence, blogs are also beginning to face a number of pressing legal
questions.-" What liability should an
anonymous poster face for a defamatory
comment on a blog, and how easy should
it be for a plaintiff to strip that poster of
his anonymity?' 9 What access should a

blogger enjoy to press credentials? 2 Are
bloggers entitled to claim either constitutional or statutory privileges to maintain
the confidentiality of sources? 2 Should
they receive the same exemptions that
mainstream media do from election law
requirements? 22 Some of these questions
directly implicate constitutional rights,
while others are founded on statutory
privileges; but all of them resound with
broader First Amendment concerns.
It is therefore a good time to think
about the legal status of blogs, and the legal issues they raise. In this contribution, I want to think specifically about
the relationship between blogs and the
Press Clause of the First Amendment.
Bloggers and others are already engaged
in an ongoing conversation about
whether some or all bloggers are journalists, and in what sense. 2 3 From there, it
is a short step to the questions posed in
this article: Are blogs part of "the press"
for purposes of the Press Clause? Should
we think of them in these terms? If we
do, what legal consequences does this
move carry both for blogs and for the
press - and for our understanding of the
Press Clause itself?
In a sense, these questions might
seem at best quixotic, at worst pointless.
It is now widely accepted that the Press
Clause is about as useful as the vermiform appendix. As Frederick Schauer
writes, "existing First Amendment doctrine renders the Press Clause redundant
and thus irrelevant, with the institutional press being treated simply as another speaker."2 4 Even those few
perquisites that have attached to the
press, such as the qualified reporter's
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privilege, have lost some of the constitutional moorings that lower courts were
willing to give them in the wake of the
Court's confused ruling in Branzburg v.
Hayes.25 In a recent article, David Anderson has suggested that "the demise of the
press as a legally preferred institution,"
whether constitutionally or under statute, "is quite possible and perhaps even
probable."26 If any heavy lifting in the
protection of blogs is likely to be done, either by the Constitution or by legislative
grace, why turn to this unfortunate redundancy of a constitutional provision?
I think there are good reasons to do
so. Thirty years after Justice Stewart
provocatively suggested that "[t]he publishing business is ...the only organized
private business that is given explicit
constitutional protection, " 27 we have arrived at a moment in which the lines between old and new media are so blurred
that the very idea of "established news
media"28 may seem antique. But this article will suggest that the second-class
status of the Press Clause should again
nevertheless be open to reexamination.
Thinking about this question in light
of the rise of the blog raises a number of
important issues. The objections that
were advanced in reaction to the initial
push by Justice Stewart and others to
give some meaning to the Press Clause
included, most prominently, the view
that it was just too difficult to define the
press, and that according the press special privileges would be an unpardonable
act of constitutional elitism.2 9 If only
some people get to be "the press," how can
we determine who is entitled to claim
that mantle, and how can we justify

granting them special privileges? On the
other hand, if anyone can now be "the
press,"3o won't any "special" protections
simply be watered down to nothing?
These are still difficult questions, and it
is not clear how the addition of blogs to
the mix affects the analysis. But they are
worth asking at this moment, both because of broader developments in constitutional theory and doctrine 3 1 and
because the rise of blogs may spark new
thoughts about this old debate. The
Press Clause may yet have important
things to tell us about our understanding
of the Constitution and its relationship to
the real world of speech.
What follows is a preliminary look at
the relationship between blogs and the
Press Clause. I will provide few definitive answers. Rather, this article will explore several ways that we might think
about the Press Clause, and about the
role of blogs within the Press Clause.
Thinking about the relationship between
blogs and the Press Clause offers an opportunity to think anew about the questions raised by that neglected provision.
It requires us to consider a series of important distinctions: between the Speech
Clause and the Press Clause; between
the "free press" and "open press" models
of the Press Clause; between being "the
press" and fulfilling the functions of "the
press"; and between thinking of the Press
Clause as a functional protection and
thinking of it in broader institutional
terms. It is on that last note that I will
suggest a possible avenue for thinking
about the Press Clause in the future - although, as we will see, the rise of the blog
may require us to take a different institu-
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tional turn than that recommended by
2
Justice Stewart in his famous article.
II. "Free Press" And "Open
Press"
We might begin looking for illumination on the future of blogs and the Press
Clause by looking back to our past. Much
has been written on the question of what,
precisely, the Press Clause was meant to
do, and whether it actually signaled that
the framers of the Constitution intended
to provide any meaningful independent
protection for the press.3 3 It is possible
that the Press Clause singled out the
press by name only because it had been
subjected to official restrictions that were
unique to that medium and inapplicable
to individual speakers. 34 Or perhaps the
Framers simply used the terms interchangeably, with little thought for any
distinct meaning the Speech and Press
35
Clauses might hold.
Those arguments might not suffice to
settle the question. I think they do not.
In the final analysis, as Professor Nimmer wrote, "It is what [the Framers] said,
and not necessarily what they meant,
that in the last analysis may be determinative " 3 6 - and what they said was that
speech and press merited separate consideration. Still, looking at the historical
understanding and development of "the
press" may help us think more clearly
about the purposes and uses of the Press
37
Clause today.
Recent work in this area may, in fact,
shed some new light on the ways we
think about the Press Clause in the age of
the blog. Drawing on the historical work

of Robert W.T. Martin, 38 some scholars
have discerned two traditions at work in
the history of law and the press in
America.39 One is the idea of a "free
press" - the idea that "the press should
be free of state intervention so as to engage in criticism of government and
thereby defend public liberty."' 0 The
press in this conception should operate as
an independent, autonomous institution
carrying out a "watchdog" function as a
monitor of government. 41 This is essentially the model Justice Stewart drew on
when he argued that the Press Clause
was meant "to create a fourth institution
outside the Government as an additional
42
check on the three official branches."
The other tradition is that of the
"open press." This is the idea that "all individuals have a right to disseminate
their viewpoints for general consideration."4 3 On this view, a free press means
nothing more than that "all people should
have the opportunity to articulate their
views for popular consideration." 44 The
press is not an expert and autonomous
watchdog scrutinizing government action. Rather, it is simply a vehicle for the
dissemination of ideas and a forum for
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open" de4
bate. These competing conceptions of "the
press" may cash out in different and interesting ways. Understanding the Press
Clause from the perspective of the "free
press" model leads to a more specific and
specialized understanding of the role of
the press within the Press Clause. It suggests, as Justice Stewart wrote, that the
clause safeguards a uniquely structural
role for the press as a monitor of the con-
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duct of public officials.46 This conception
of the Press Clause could serve as the
source of a richer, more positive set of
protections for the press. To the extent
the press serves a structural role as a
check on the "official branches" of government, 47 it is but a small step - though not
an inevitable one4 8 - to argue that the
Press Clause provides some degree of
privileges 49 and immunities- for the
press. At the same time, the free press
model raises the definitional concerns I
have already noted, and gives rise to the
charge that the Constitution should create no privileged institutions. 51 Moreover, to the extent that the free press
model is based squarely on the press's
function as a watchdog of government, it
offers little direct basis for institutional
protection of the press when it discusses
issues other than public affairs, such as
sports or entertainment. (The Speech
Clause, of course, could pick up the slack
there; but it would not do so in a way that
is specifically oriented to the press as an
institution.)
The "open press" model avoids these
problems. It is less likely to be limited in
orientation to press discussions of public
affairs; and because the model "conveys
the right to free expression to individu"5 2
it
als, rather than to an institution,
does not face the same problems of definition or elitism. At the same time, the
open press model does not do the same
degree of work that the free press model
potentially could. To the extent that the
free press model simply acknowledges
the right of "all individuals" to "disseminate their viewpoints," 53 it is unlikely to
say anything about reporters' privileges,

press access, or any other positive rights
of the press. The open press model thus
does seem to invite the charge of earlier
writers on the Press Clause that it risks
becoming redundant in light of the protections already offered by the Speech
Clause.5 4 Indeed, the open press model
may at times even be suggestive of additional limits on the press: if one generalizes from the view that the open press
model historically entailed the willingness of publishers to offer up to the public
any views that were presented to them, 55
then the open press model lends support
to the view, rejected thus far by the
Court, that newspapers ought to be required to make their pages available to a
broad range of contending views, just as
broadcasters may constitutionally be re56
quired to do so.
A good deal of evidence suggests that
citizens in the founding era would have
understood the "press" protected by the
Press Clause according to something like
the open press model. If by the free press
model we mean something like the model
of an "organized, expert" body capable of
57
conducting "scrutiny of government,"'
then few if any of the newspapers extant
during the pre-Revolutionary and Revolutionary periods met these criteria51 Although the press evolved during the
Revolutionary era and afterwards, its
evolution was less toward the development of an expert and autonomous institution than it was in the direction of an
aggressively partisan press, beholden to
the Revolutionary and party interests
each newspaper served. 59 The development of an understanding of "the press"
more closely aligned with our own
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modern understanding of journalism reasonably expert, autonomous, disinterested, governed by professional norms
and dedicated to its watchdog function would not occur until the 1830s, at the
earliest, and perhaps as late as the early
20th century. °
So the historical evidence suggests
that the Framers would have thought of
the press primarily in terms of the open
press model. But we must be careful not
to overstate this conclusion. While the
early American press little resembled the
professional watchdog described in Justice Stewart's article, the Revolutionary
and post-Revolutionary eras did see the
increasing development of norms of journalistic autonomy and the rise of newspaper editors who were "becoming seriously
engaged in political reporting and in
presenting to [their] readership, the citizenry, a systematic account of government."61 Even at the outset of this
nation's constitutionalization of press
freedom, in other words, the concept of a
free and institutional press serving a
watchdog function, with all that this concept entails, was in the air.62 It was thus
no accident that the state constitution
adopted by Pennsylvania in 1776 acknowledged both the open press concept
63
and the free press concept.
Taken as a whole, this history suggests that there may indeed be a home for
blogs in the Press Clause, if we view that
provision according to the open press
model.- In their current state, many
blogs resemble in many respects the passionate, partisan,65 largely amateur and
often anonymous collection of printers
and writers who were at work during the

founding era, and who were memorialized in the Press Clause.66 To the extent
the blogosphere resembles the press of
the founding era, it may then be natural
to suggest that our thoughts concerning
the constitutional status of and protection for blogs should stem as much from
the Press Clause as from the Speech
Clause. Moreover, we can protect blogs
under an open press model of the Press
Clause without incurring at least some of
the risks that this model entails. In particular, the nature of blogs obviates the
concern that an open press model may
fuel calls for forced access to another's
"press."67 Given the inexpensive nature
of blogging,68 we can ensure a diversity of
views without having to treat any blog as
a public good that may be forced to offer
space to individuals with contrary views.
Thus, blogs find a natural home in
the open press model of the Press Clause.
We should hesitate before settling on this
model, however, for two related reasons.
First, as I have already suggested, if the
open press model is largely about the protection of "uninhibited, robust and wideopen" debate,69 then the Press Clause
does not do anything that the Speech
Clause does not already do; we are back
to the redundancy problem.
Second, however mixed the success of
the advocates of a free press model of the
Press Clause may have been,70 we should
not be too swift to trade in that understanding of the Press Clause, with its
more vigorous protection for the newsgathering process, for a model that sacrifices that vigor for the sake of the
universality of the right. 71 The institutional press captured in the free press
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model, and in Justice Stewart's argument
for the Press Clause as a structural guarantee, continues to fulfill important functions in our society.7 2 Even if that model
has been less than a complete success as
a constitutional argument, it continues to
support arguments in favor of a host of
non-constitutional privileges that the
press enjoys, and which help it to fulfill
its vital newsgathering function. 73 We
ought to be reluctant to trade in this understanding of the Press Clause too
quickly. 74 Our first cut at understanding
the relationship between blogs and the
Press Clause is thus not completely satisfying.

watchdog model more generally, is that it
involves, not a status, but an activity: it
involves skilled newsgathering, interviewing, ferreting out of facts, investigative reporting - in short, that set of
activities we call "journalism." If that is
so, we should not think of the constitutional status of blogs in terms of a contest
between blogs and the mainstream media.76 Rather, we might think about the
Press Clause, or various statutes that
protect the press, as offering protection to
certain functions that may be performed
by either blogs or the established institutional press. We could think in terms of
constitutional or non-constitutional pro77
tection for the function of journalism.

III. Blogs, "The Press," and
"Journalism":A Functional
Approach

This way of thinking about the Press
Clause assumes that some form of
heightened protection ought to be available for individuals or institutions when
they engage in activities that meet some
definition of the practice of journalism.
For example, we might say that an individual who "is involved in a process that
is intended to generate and disseminate
truthful information to the public on a
regular basis" is a journalist, and ought
to be able to claim whatever protections
the Press Clause provides for that process, or whatever non-constitutional
sources of protection the legislatures or
common law provide for the newsgathering process.7 Or we might conclude that
any person may claim some set of privileges where he or she is engaged in investigative reporting, gathering news, and
doing so with the present intention to disseminate the news to the public.79

We have seen that one potential understanding of the Press Clause is that it
helps to ensure "organized, expert scrutiny of government" by granting substantial protection to the press as a sort of
fourth branch of government.7 5 This understanding of the Press Clause serves an
important social value but is less accommodating to the often disorganized and
inexpert nature of blogs. Is there a way
to preserve this socially valuable understanding of the Press Clause without
slighting the role that blogs may play
under this provision?
The answer, I think, is yes, and it
raises another distinction drawn by this
article - the distinction between being
"the press" and doing the work of the
press. The usual understanding of "expert scrutiny of government," and of the

T

In a variety of ways, this functional
approach to the understanding of those
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protections afforded to "the press,"
whether by the Constitution or by various statutes, is already a common feature
in the law. This functional approach is
often quite apparent. For example, a
number of courts have taken a functional
approach when examining claims of constitutional or statutory qualified privilege
by a variety of individuals: a person who
gathered information for personal use
and later decided to use that information
to write a book,80 an investigative reporter who deliberately set out to gather
information for a book,"1 and the producer of taped commentaries for a 900
number controlled by the World Championship Wrestling organization.8 2 Legal
academics have proposed a slew of similar approaches.8 3 And, of course, the
states that have adopted statutory reporters' privileges have relied, at least in
part, on functional definitions when
drafting those statutory protections.8 To
these shield statutes we could also add a
variety of federal and state statutes dealing with questions of press access to information or to government proceedings,
freedom from intrusive searches, and
other privileges or immunities.8 5 But a
functional understanding of the press is
also present in the law in ways that may
be less apparent. Thus, Randall Bezanson has argued persuasively that many
courts, when examining the contours of
constitutional protection for the press in
libel cases, have asked whether the press
actor was exercising editorial judgment,
defined as the "independent choice of information and opinion of current value,
directed to public need, and born of nonself-interested purposes ."86

Depending on how one defines the
function ofjournalism, this functional understanding of the Press Clause could obviously protect blogs as well as the more
established and recognized press. A popular question asked in blogging circles
has been whether blogging is journalism. 87 Often, the answer is a fairly blunt
"no.""" But a functional approach to the
Press Clause suggests that this is just another instance of asking the wrong question, 9 or at least of asking it too broadly
and bluntly. It now seems safer to say,
not that all blogs are a form of journalism, or that blogging is never journalism,
but that "some Weblogs are doing journalism, at least part of the time."90 At the
very least, when a blogger engages in
fact-gathering for purposes of public dissemination of newsworthy information,
that blogger can be seen as having engaged in an act of journalism that is worthy of some constitutional or statutory
protection.
A functional understanding of the
Press Clause, or of the myriad statutory
protections that fulfill the potential of the
Press Clause, thus would provide a measure of protection to blogs when they are
actively engaged in those core activities
that we think of as constituting journalism. The medium by which that journalism is disseminated to the public matters
far less than the fact that an individual
has deliberately gathered and disseminated newsworthy facts.9 1
Some observations about this approach are in order. First, it should be
noted that a number of current statutory
protections for journalism partake of institutional elements that would leave
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blogs unprotected even if they were engaged in journalism.92 For example, California's shield law requires the person
claiming the protection of the law to be
"connected with or employed upon a
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
publication, or by a press association or
wire service"; 9 3 and New York's statute
provides protection only to regular employees of news organizations or those
who are "otherwise professionally affiliated for gain or livelihood" with news organizations.9 4 Leaving aside the difficult
question whether the Press Clause or
some other constitutional provision requires the protection of bloggers, a functional approach certainly recommends
that states reexamine their shield laws
with bloggers in mind, focusing on function rather than affiliation.
Second, I have assumed that the
functional approach is most relevant for
positive claims that a blogger should be
entitled to the same privileges or immunities - the right not to be compelled to
reveal one's sources, the right to resist
searches, the right of access to government records or proceedings, and so forth
- that the traditional press have, in one
way or another, been able to claim. As
such, I have assumed a fairly narrow
compass for the functional approach.
This approach would thus offer little protection for the primary activity of most
blogs (and many newspapers, for that
matter) - "shaping, filtering, commenting, contextualizing, and disseminating
..the news reports that others have produced." 95 That does not mean that such
blogs are simply left out in the cold; they
may still rely on the protections offered

by the Speech Clause. But it does suggest that a functional approach would
only protect some of the functions performed by blogs or the established press.
Is the functional approach, then, a
better way of understanding both the
Press Clause and the role of blogs within
the Press Clause? One might think so.
Certainly this approach would protect
much of what is at the core of journalism:
not merely first-person observation, but
the gathering of facts from a variety of
sources for the purposes of public dissemination of important information. And
because it is available to anyone who engages in the function of journalism, and
not simply those individuals who are employed by recognized and established
news media, this approach gets rid of any
96
concerns about elitism.
Nevertheless, we should not be
wholly satisfied with this approach.
First, the functional approach may avoid
one definitional problem - are blogs journalism? - only to replace it with other,
equally difficult definitional questions:
What is journalism, exactly? And which
aspects of journalism - editorial judgment, newsgathering, or something else deserve special protection? It is not
enough to say that "[ilf what the press
does receives sufficient protection, who
the 'institutional press' is becomes unimportant";97 that response simply raises
the question of what it is that the press
does that we consider worthy of protection. Once we decide that certain journalistic functions merit heightened
protection, whether under the Press
Clause or under a statute, then a definitional problem is simply inevitable. And
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if it was once true that "a court [or a legislature] ha[d] little difficulty knowing a
journalist when it [saw] one,"9g it is safe
to say that adding blogs to the mix complicates the situation considerably. Furthermore, because blogs rarely involve
the kinds of internal controls that govern
in the newsroom - in particular, the restraining force of professional norms of
reporting, the presence of layers of editors, the time for reflection provided by
(usually) non-instantaneous communication, and the simple cost of establishing a
newspaper or other news medium - there
may be more reasons to worry that bloggers will invoke the legal protections
offered to journalists for purely opportunistic reasons. 99
These objections should not carry too
much weight. If one believes that the
newsgathering function merits added
protection, the definitional problems and
the threat of opportunism must simply be
counted as part of the inevitable but necessary cost of seeing those additional protections into being. Nevertheless, even if
one sets these objections aside, something still seems lacking in the functional
approach. Focusing on function alone
hardly seems to capture all the ways in
which the news media, old or new, contribute to our social discourse. It seems a
thin conception of the ways in which
mainstream media form a part of the
fabric of our social life simply to suggest
that they add some store of new facts to
what we knew already. It does not describe, in Professor Balkin's words, the
ways in which old media form part of the
ongoing conversation that makes up our
"democratic culture." 1° ° And if that is

true of conventional media, it is doubly
true of blogs, whose value consists primarily of their role as "participatory media,"1°1 and which have quickly established their own unique role in our
cultural conversation. A functional approach to the role of the blogosphere
within the Press Clause does not seem to
engage its real role, which is only secondarily about "journalism" and far more
about its status as a "miniature public
sphere of its own."102
A functional approach to the role of
blogs within the Press Clause thus helps
to isolate some of the most socially valuable aspects of the journalistic enterprise,
and to protect those aspects of journalism
in both their online and offline aspects.
But it seems to lack the descriptive power
to capture all the reasons why we value
and protect "the press," old and new. Its
failure to differentiate between the old
and new media has the virtue of protecting both blogs and the traditional press but only at the cost of failing to accurately describe the unique features and
promises of each separate institution.
IV. Stewart Redux: A New
Institutional Approach
So I return to the inspiration for the
title of this contribution: Justice Stewart's provocative suggestion that we
think of the Press Clause as "a structural
provision of the Constitution" that protects "the institutional autonomy of the
press." °0 We might conclude after thirty
years that Stewart's institutional vision
of the Press Clause is a non-starter. The
Supreme Court certainly has never
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signed on to anything like a fully fledged
version of Stewart's description of the
Press Clause, and one would think it
would be even more untenable now that
"anyone with a computer or a mobile
phone is a potential reporter and publisher. " 10 4 But despite the assumption
that Justice Stewart's institutional autonomy version of the Press Clause died
aborning, there may be more life in it
than one would expect.
Building in part on Justice Stewart's
foundation, this last section argues in
favor of an institutional vision of the
Press Clause. Notwithstanding the many
criticisms that have been heaped on his
suggestion, 1 5 this section argues that an
institutional understanding of the Press
Clause can be a normatively attractive
approach. Moreover, it is also a more descriptively accurate account of what actually happens in First Amendment
doctrine than is generally supposed.
Under an institutional approach to the
First Amendment, it is not out of the
question that blogs, despite their evident
variety, can and should find some degree
of protection in the Press Clause as an
autonomous "press" institution in their
own right.
In making this argument, I leave
much open for future discussion. It is
certainly not clear at this point what the
precise scope and nature of the protection
blogs might enjoy under an institutional
approach to the Press Clause would be;
and it is not necessarily the case that
blogs ought to enjoy precisely the same
degree of protection that the established
news media would enjoy in their own
right under an institutional approach to

the Press Clause. Instead, I will argue
that the established press and the blogosphere should each be protected largely
according to the internal norms - evolving norms, in the case of the blogosphere
- that govern each of these "First Amendment institutions." °6
We might start by stepping back from
the Press Clause and thinking about
First Amendment doctrine more generally. 107 Frederick Schauer has argued
persuasively that the current state of the
doctrine might be characterized as one of
institutional agnosticism. 10 8 The Supreme Court's general reluctance to invest the Press Clause with any content
that might suggest press speakers have
different rights than individual speakers
is but one example. In its Free Exercise
jurisprudence, it has also moved away
from a willingness to privilege religious
conduct against generally applicable government rules. 10 9 More generally, its focus on content-neutrality and contentdiscrimination "has become the cornerstone of [its] First Amendment jurisprudence," 110 and it has applied this
approach and its exceptions without regard, usually, for the specific medium or
context in which the speech at issue occurs."'
There are some good arguments in
favor of an institutionally agnostic approach.112 But the cost of this approach is
that the Court is obliged to force the complex real world in which speech occurs
onto the Procrustean bed of its First
Amendment doctrine, to draw myriad exceptions, or simply to distort the existing
doctrine. 1 3 The result is a doctrine that
is rife with "vague definitions, marginally
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(at best) useful three- and four-part tests,
and slippery and hard to apply categories" - a "not-all-that-bad" doctrine 114
that, at its worst, approaches incoherence. 115
As I have argued elsewhere, we
might take another approach.116 Rather
than build First Amendment doctrine
from the top down, crafting general rules
that apply imperfectly across a range of
situations, the courts might begin with
the recognition that a "number of existing
social institutions" - such as the press,
universities, religious associations, libraries, and perhaps others - "serve functions that the First Amendment deems
especially important."" 7 Building on this
foundation, the courts could "construct
First Amendment doctrine in response to
the actual functions and practices" of
those institutions that merit recognition
as "First Amendment institutions. " ' 18
Under this approach, the Court
would identify those institutions that
merit recognition as First Amendment institutions." 9 Those institutions would
then be granted significant presumptive
autonomy to act, and the courts would defer substantially to actions taken by
those institutions within their respective
spheres of autonomy. The courts might
go further still, and recognize instances
in which the social value served by some
First Amendment institution counsels
privileges or immunities, such as some
degree of protection for reporters' ability
to maintain the confidentiality of their
sources, that might not be available to
other speakers.120 The courts might, in
short, value First Amendment institutions as institutions, and accord them

substantial autonomy to act within that
institutional framework.
To argue for an institutional approach to the First Amendment is not the
equivalent of an argument in favor of an
absolute constitutional immunity for
First Amendment institutions. That a
First Amendment institution might have
substantial autonomy to act does not
mean it would not be obliged to act within
"constitutionally prescribed limits."121
This approach does entail granting a substantial degree of self-governance to
those institutions that play a substantial
role in contributing to the world of public
discourse that the First Amendment aims
to promote and preserve. But my point is
precisely that these institutions are already substantially self-governing institutions: they operate in accordance with
an often detailed and highly constraining
set of internal norms that govern the
bounds of appropriate behavior within
different First Amendment institutions.
An institutional approach thus simply suggests that courts should, in the
first instance, defer to those institutions'
capacity for self-governance rather than
attempt to impose an ill-fitting doctrinal
framework based on the idea that one set
of First Amendment rules can and should
apply to the radically different social institutions in which speech takes place.
To the extent it is necessary to build
some set of "constitutionally prescribed
limits" around the behavior of those institutions, the courts should build from the
bottom up, taking their cue from the
norms and practices of the institution in
question and from the social values
served by that institution. Thus, the
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court might ask of a First Amendment institution's action in a particular case, not
whether it comports with some universal
First Amendment rule, but whether it
falls within the boundaries of behavior
broadly consistent with the norms and
practices of that institution, and whether
those norms and practices serve the First
Amendment values that are advanced by
the role of that institution within the
22
broader society.1
A First Amendment doctrine built
from the ground up around the value and
practices of existing "First Amendment
institutions" has a number of qualities
that ought to be normatively attractive.
Not least, it offers a way of thinking
about the First Amendment that actually
responds to the differentiation that is apparent in the real world between different kinds of speech institutions - the
different contexts in which speech occurs,
the internalized norms of conduct that
constrain the speakers in each institution, and the social values served by the
kinds of speech that are central to different kinds of institutions.123 It is far more
attuned to the actual speech- and pressoriented social practices the First
Amendment serves to promote. It thus
avoids the doctrinal incoherence that is
inevitable when courts attempt to fashion
a First Amendment doctrine that tries,
and fails, to be all things to all kinds of
speakers and speech situations.
Moreover, because it is willing to engage in some institutional differentiation
rather than fashion generally applicable
rules, the institutional approach to the
First Amendment may be both better
suited to protecting the full range of

speech and speech-related activities engaged in by different First Amendment
institutions, and more conscious of the
limits of those institutions. In other
words, it may avoid being either overprotective or underprotective of any given institution. 124 The law of reporters'
2 5
privileges may offer one such example.
Although many lower courts and state
legislatures protect reporters from divulging the identity of their sources, the
Supreme Court could not find a majority
to firmly back this position, in part due to
the "practical and conceptual difficulties"
inherent in the inevitable question
whether particular "categories of newsmen qualified for the privilege."126 This
unwillingness to engage in any institutional differentiation between the press
and other speech institutions may result
in a less vigorous protection for newsgathering than is enjoyed in other legal
systems, which have found on both statutory and constitutional grounds that re12 7
porters are entitled to such a privilege.
If readers concede that this vision
carries some attractive qualities, the objection still may be made that urging the
Supreme Court to shift so radically from
its current approach to First Amendment
doctrine is unrealistic. That objection is
unfounded. In various ways, the Court
already acknowledges the unique value of
a variety of traditional speech institu2
tions, the press not least among them.1
This tendency is perhaps most apparent
in the cases involving the law of government speech, in which the Court has
shaped its doctrine according to whether
the government speaker is acting as a library, 129 a journalist, 30 or an arts
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funder.'3' It is also evident in the Court's
hesitant but clear recognition that universities operate under principles of academic freedom that require them to have
some constitutionally grounded autonomy to make educational decisions, even
in the face of countervailing constitutional principles such as that of non-dis-

crimination. 132 It is also arguable that
these cases can be seen as part of a
broader trend on the current Court of recognizing and protecting the autonomy of
a variety of intermediary institutions
that serve a vital social and structural
33
roles in our society.
If we think of the First Amendment
in institutional terms, the Press Clause is
obviously the most natural, most textually rooted place to find some form of institutional autonomy for what we might
label the conventional working press.
Here, too, we may see some traces of institutionally oriented thinking in the Supreme Court's treatment of the press.
Although it is true that the Court has refused to explicitly grant the press any institutional autonomy, underneath the
surface the picture is a little different.
Most famously, although a splintered
Court ultimately rejected the claim of a
constitutionally grounded reporter's privilege in Branzburg, a plurality of the
Court in that case did say, "Nor is it suggested [here] that news gathering does
not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could
be eviscerated."134 The Court has also repeatedly suggested that in evaluating
cases involving the press, it will erect a
sphere of autonomy around the press's

performance of some of its key functions,
such as editing. 35 Finally, although the
protections of New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny may also apply to
non-media speakers,'13 it is clear that the
constitutional rules governing defamation actions involving public figures or
matters of public concern were crafted
with the press in mind. 137 In sum, in a
variety of ways, the Court's treatment of
issues involving the press has both informed and, more importantly, been informed by a series of norms and
principles that emerge from the nature of
the press as an institution.
Linking these findings to the broader
point of this section, we might take from
this discussion the possibility that the
Court could - and should - become more

self-conscious about using the Press
Clause to grant some degree of institutional autonomy to the press. While that
autonomy naturally must be subject to
some set of "constitutionally prescribed
[outer] limits,"138 in shaping those limits
the Court might turn substantially to the
press's own norms of self-governance for
guidance.
This brings us back to blogs, the subject of this Symposium. In thinking
about the relationship between blogs and
the law, we might take the institutional
approach to the First Amendment as our
starting point. Blogs can be thought of as
a kind of emerging First Amendment institution. More particularly, they can be
viewed as an especially visible and wellcrystallized example of a broader developing speech institution: the unique environment that is public discourse in
cyberspace.139 Once we think of blogs as
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a First Amendment institution, we might
ask whether the Press Clause, recognizing the blogosphere as a unique form of
"press," could accord the blogosphere a
similar form of institutional autonomy,
and create some breathing space for the
formation and evolution of this new institutional form of public discourse.
Conceiving of blogs as a type of First
Amendment institution, entitled to substantial autonomy as an institution,
raises some difficult questions about the
scope of autonomy blogs should enjoy. In
particular, notwithstanding the disdain
for the professionalized print and broadcast press that is so common in the blogosphere,140 there are good reasons to
believe that the institutional structure of
the established news media makes them
better suited for some degree of legally
granted, constitutionally grounded institutional autonomy than blogs might be.
The established news media typically operate subject to a set of ethical and professional norms, made explicit in a host of
ethical codes and, more importantly, absorbed by individual journalists in a
deeply embedded sense of professional
identity that shapes and constrains their
actions. 141 Indeed, it may be the case that
those internal norms are a far better predictor of the nature and limits of press
behavior than any norms that could be
imposed from the top down by the
courts. 142 In addition, mainstream news
media are subject to a variety of constraints that emerge from the editing
process and the simple fact of their corporate and hierarchical structure. 143 Blogs,
on the other hand, are written by individuals or small groups, and postings are

typically transmitted without editing and
often without much reflection on the part
of the blogger. Nor are many bloggers enamored of the idea of a bloggers' code of
ethics .144
To raise these questions does not
mean that blogs should not receive any
institutional protection under the Press
Clause, however. Rather, these questions simply lead to the conclusion that
an institutionally differentiated First
Amendment would naturally suggest:
that an institutional approach to blogs
under the Press Clause should attempt to
draw the contours of blogs' institutional
autonomy in a way that is appropriate to
blogs as an institution. On this view, it
would be an error to characterize blogs as
"a new form of journalism,"' 14 and attempt to draw institutional protections
that simply ape whatever institutional
protections the conventional press are entitled to. Instead, we should ask what
protections are necessary given the purpose, value, and nature of blogs as an institution.
If we consider blogs from this institutional perspective, the first thing that is
apparent is that blogs form a collective
institution. Although it may make sense
to think of newspapers as singular, if
similar, entities, it makes less sense to
think of blogs as isolated speech instruments. We might say, grandiosely, that
there are no blogs - there is only the
blogosphere. Blogging ultimately is a collective enterprise, and must be understood as part of the distinctly collective
and participatory public discourse that is
146
speech in cyberspace.
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Once blogs are viewed collectively
rather than individually, there is much to
be said for the idea that blogs do enjoy
the kind of institutional framework that
makes it less dangerous for courts to cede
a considerable degree of autonomy to
them. 147 Typically, we rely on newspapers to correct their own errors; we thus
emphasize, through libel law, the importance of newspapers' acting according to
the proper institutional norms: reporting
and editing without actual malice, and
with the sound exercise of editorial judgment. 14 Blogs' correction practices are
not singular but collective: errors are exposed and corrected through the exposure
of mistakes and the airing of corrective
views on many, many other blogs. 149 Furthermore, whatever bloggers may say
about not wanting a code of ethics to be
imposed on them, it should be apparent
to anyone who has engaged in sustained
blogging that an organic set of norms and
practices has evolved, and continues to
evolve, in the blogosphere. Bloggers already seek to conform to a wide variety of
relevant norms: norms in favor of linking
to other sites; norms in favor of linking to
the newspaper article or other source
that forms the subject of, and that supports (or refutes) the arguments made by,
the blogger in a given post; norms in
favor of correcting or disputing errors
that have been pointed out by others; and
norms in favor of allowing commenters,
who also serve as error-correcting
agents.1 50 Corresponding to these norms
is an evolving set of norms that govern
readers' expectations on the blogosphere:
norms that suggest that certain sites may
be more trustworthy than, others, and

that assertions made on any one site
ought not be completely credited unless
and until they have been verified elsewhere.151
In sum, the norms developing in and
around the blogosphere - both bloggers'
norms and readers' norms - suggest the
development of an institutional framework that may collectively do much of the
verification, correction, and trust-establishing work that established news media
institutions do individually. These conclusions lead us to some tentative
thoughts about what an institutional
First Amendment approach to blogs
under the Press Clause might look like.
Certainly it would entail the same assumption I have urged should govern the
treatment of the established press under
the Press Clause: that they should be
given substantial institutional autonomy
by the courts. But the shape of that autonomy, built from the ground up based
on what we know of social discourse in
the blogosphere, might be different.
For example, with respect to defamation law, it might make sense to shape legal doctrine in a way that recognizes the
collective environment in which speech
and the correction of errors takes place in
the blogosphere. I do not mean by this
that individual blogs would be utterly immune from liability for defamation simply because of the fact that errors might
be corrected elsewhere in the blogosphere. We might, for instance, give
greater or lesser immunity to individual
blogs depending on how much they actually make use of this collective error-correcting mechanism: the degree to which
they link to the sources they cite, the de-
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gree to which they track back to other
sites, the degree to which they allow commentary, the degree to which they respond to others' efforts to correct them,
the degree to which they actually acknowledge and correct errors, and so
forth.
It is not clear how arguments for
more affirmative rights, such as rights of
access or rights against the compelled
disclosure of sources, should fare under
an institutional First Amendment treatment of blogs. It is obviously impossible
to grant press credentials to every blog
that might request them, for example.
But it is also the case that most blogs still
rely on original reporting supplied primarily by the established news media.152 So
it might be the case that an individual's
claim of constitutional access rights
under the Press Clause would fail on institutional grounds. For similar reasons,
it is not clear how we should treat bloggers' claims of a constitutionally
grounded privilege of nondisclosure of
sources. But the age of the blogger-journalist is still young, and we should look to
the norms and practices that develop in
considering this question over the long
term.
Would an institutional understanding of blogs' place under the Press Clause
offer any payoff for blogs, or for our understanding of First Amendment doctrine? I think it would. To be sure, much
of the law that would result from an explicitly institutional approach to the First
Amendment and blogs would resemble
existing First Amendment doctrine. That
has less to do, however, with the sufficiency of existing doctrine, and more to do

with the fact that the existing doctrine already contorts itself in an effort to respond to the nature and value of different
speech institutions. 153 An institutional
approach would simply permit courts to
do explicitly, transparently, and self-consciously what they already do implicitly
and clumsily.
Moreover, because an institutionally
differentiated understanding of the role
of blogs would not simply attempt to import the law of the established press
wholesale into this very different medium, it would ease the fear that if everyone is treated as "the press," any rights
granted under the Press Clause will be so
diluted as to be meaningless.1 -4 Rather,
it would be clear that the Press Clause
protects more than one institution, and
that the content of the rights pertaining
to each must vary according to the nature
and practices of each institution. Thinking of blogs on an institutional level
would also encourage courts to pay attention to such issues as blogs' treatment
under the election laws155 and how they
should be treated for purposes of taxation,1 56 keeping in mind both the commonalities and differences between blogs
and the established press.
Most importantly, an institutional
approach to the treatment of blogs under
the Press Clause would encourage courts
to more self-consciously consider blogs in
context: to give blogs substantial autonomy to act, while monitoring the development of norms of behavior in the
blogosphere and encouraging blogs to develop rules of conduct that deter the
worst of the social ills that might emerge
from the blogosphere. It would en-
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courage courts to develop a constitutional
law of blogging that allows the relevant
legal norms to emerge from those cultural norms that the blogs develop themselves. In this way, our constitutional
law, whether with respect to blogs or
with respect to the press, universities,
and other First Amendment institutions,
will be the product of an organic dialogue
about legal, constitutional, and cultural
norms both inside and outside of the
57
courts. 1
V.

Conclusion

In this contribution, I have offered
three ways of looking at the status of
blogs under the Press Clause of the First
Amendment - and, not incidentally, three
ways of looking at the Press Clause itself.
The first approach distinguishes between
the "free press" and "open press" models
of the Press Clause. Following this approach, if we acknowledge the historical
roots of the open press model in the Press
Clause and revive an open press-oriented
understanding of that clause, would
make room for blogs within the Press
Clause; but it would do so at the cost of
any meaningful content for rights enjoyed by blogs - or anyone else - under
the Press Clause. The second approach
would focus instead on a functional understanding of the Press Clause; it would
focus more on doing "journalism" than on
who qualifies as "the press." This approach may do a better job of protecting
some of the conduct we value most in
journalism, and it would have the added
virtue of protecting that conduct whether
it is undertaken by journalists working

for the established press or by bloggerjournalists. But it raises definitional concerns of its own, and in any event it does
not seem to fully and richly capture all
that we value in either the established
press or the blogosphere.
The third approach - an institutional
understanding of the Press Clause, and of
the First Amendment generally - is perhaps the most controversial approach. In
some ways, it seems to require us to
make the biggest leap from existing doctrine. It requires hard thinking about the
nature of the Press Clause; it requires us
to cede autonomy to private institutions,
a move that many people are sure to resist; and it requires us to do so not only
for the established press alone, but for
new institutions such as blogs and the
blogosphere. In other ways, though, we
might think of the conceptual leap required here as being not so great in the
final analysis; after all, an institutional
understanding of the Press Clause simply
reflects the lived reality of our speech institutions.
In many respects, I have argued, the
institutional approach is also the most
promising and intriguing way to think
about the legal status of blogs, and about
the meaning of the Press Clause and the
First Amendment. However different
Justice Stewart's views ultimately may
be from those offered here, and notwithstanding the fact that he stood at a temporal midpoint between the dimly
remembered "lonely pamphleteer" of our
past 158 and the as-yet-unforeseen rise of
the blogger, Justice Stewart's seminal article on the Press Clause may still carry
important lessons thirty years later.
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